On payday a number appears in your banking app, and you do nothing to make it happen. Behind that number sit three promises. That your employer’s bank will pay your bank. That your bank will pay you when you ask. And that if a bank stumbles, someone above it will step in. In 2007 and 2008 all three were tested, in that order. The numbers in people’s accounts were right the whole way through. What broke was the certainty that the other side would pay.
The first promise: your employer’s bank pays yours
Your salary does not travel. Your employer’s bank lowers a line in its ledger, the list of who owes what to whom, your bank raises a line in its own, and then the two banks settle up. At the end of every day some banks have more cash than they need and some have less, so they lend to each other overnight, on nothing but a promise.
On 9 August 2007 that promise cracked. A French bank announced it had frozen three funds, because “the complete evaporation of liquidity” had made the things inside them impossible to value. Liquidity is money you can use today, as opposed to things you own but cannot turn into money right now. That morning, according to the European Central Bank, trading between banks nearly stopped. The same day the ECB lent 94.8 billion euros to 49 banks, for one night.
You can watch this promise as a number: how much extra one bank charges another to lend for three months, instead of rolling over a safe loan night after night. Call it the price of trust between banks. Before August 2007 it was about a tenth of a percentage point. By October 2008 it was about thirty-six times that. After Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, the biggest bankruptcy in American history, in the ECB’s words, banks essentially stopped lending each other money.
Why nobody knew whom to trust
The losses were real, and they came from mortgages. According to the official American inquiry, a mortgage on one home in south Florida could end up split across dozens of investments, owned by hundreds of investors. Each slice came with a grade.
That grade is a credit rating: a grade for how likely a debt is to be paid back, with triple-A at the top. Like a mark on a school test, it is only as good as whoever does the marking. In 2006 alone, one agency gave triple-A to thirty mortgage investments every working day, and 83% of that year’s triple-A mortgage investments were later downgraded.
Was it all fraud? Partly. One estimate given to the inquiry puts the losses from fraud on mortgages made between 2005 and 2007 at 112 billion dollars. But fraud does not explain why everything stopped. What stopped everything was not knowing which bank held the bad slices. A grade is an estimate of the odds, never a guarantee, and in 2007 the estimates stopped being believed all at once.
The second promise: your bank pays you when you ask
A bank run is when everyone who is owed asks on the same day. Nobody has been robbed; the promise simply cannot be kept to all of them at once. The runs of 2008 were largely big depositors, like companies moving the money they pay wages with: the money that becomes someone’s payday.
At Washington Mutual, deposits started flowing out on 15 September 2008: 16.7 billion dollars in about ten days, with no famous queues. On 25 September the bank was closed and sold the same evening. The next morning its branches opened as usual. The biggest bank failure in American history, and no depositor lost their money.
The same week, a fund built to be worth exactly one dollar a share slipped to 97 cents. Its own notice said it plainly: it is possible to lose money. The dollar was a target, not a promise. Its investors later got back more than 98 cents. The difference sits in the wording. One was a deposit, with a guarantee behind it. The other was a fund, and it had only ever said it would try.
The third promise: someone above the bank
On 7 October 2008, according to the British finance minister’s own account, the chairman of the Royal Bank of Scotland told him the bank would run out of money in the early afternoon. Six days later the government agreed to put twenty billion pounds into it, and in the end owned about 84%. That is a bailout: a government putting public money into a bank so that it does not fall. In America a plan worth up to 700 billion dollars had been signed into law on 3 October, and the size of the Fed’s books more than doubled in a year.
Where does money like that come from? The head of America’s central bank answered on television in March 2009, without mentioning a single printing press. That answer, set next to the official rules of Monopoly, is the heart of the video for this block.
The short version: above your bank’s ledger sits someone who can add lines to it.
Why Bitcoin’s first block quotes a bailout
On 3 January 2009 Bitcoin’s record got its very first entry, and whoever started it typed a headline from that day’s Times into it: “Chancellor on brink of second bailout for banks.” Second, because the first was the October rescue you just read about.
That does not make the crisis the cause. Asked on a forum how long they had been working on it, whoever started it answered: since 2007. The paper that first described Bitcoin never mentions the crisis. Thirty-nine days after that first entry, the same person wrote: “The root problem with conventional currency is all the trust that’s required to make it work.” The crisis did not start that work. It supplied the headline for its first page.
Payday, after 2008
The fix worked, and it had a price. In 2006 almost one American in two told Gallup they had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in banks. By 2009 it was just over one in five.
The three promises are still there every payday, out of sight. Your employer’s bank will pay yours because banks expect each other to pay. Your bank will hand you cash because not everyone asks on the same day. And above both, since the autumn of 2008, everyone knows who can write new lines.
In short
- The 2008 crisis was not money vanishing from accounts: it was the certainty that the other side would pay breaking, one layer at a time.
- The first promise to crack was between banks: on 9 August 2007 lending between them nearly stopped, and it came close to stopping entirely after Lehman Brothers failed.
- Nobody knew where the losses were, because mortgages had been cut into slices, spread across investors and given top grades that did not hold.
- At Washington Mutual, the biggest bank failure in American history, no depositor lost their money: the promise between saver and bank was held up from above.
- The fix showed who sits above the banks' ledgers and what they can do: governments and central banks can write new lines.
Frequently asked questions
What caused the 2008 financial crisis?
Real losses on American mortgages, which had been cut into slices, sold on and often graded far too generously. Some of it was fraud. But what froze the system was uncertainty: nobody knew which bank was holding the losses, so banks stopped lending to each other. From there the doubt reached savers, and finally governments had to step in.
Did people lose the money in their bank accounts in 2008?
At Washington Mutual, the biggest bank failure in American history, no depositor lost their money: the bank was closed and sold on the same evening, and its branches opened the next morning as usual. A fund built to hold one dollar a share did slip to 97 cents, and its investors later got back more than 98 cents.
What is a bank bailout?
A bailout is a government putting public money into a bank so that it does not fall. In October 2008 the British government agreed to put twenty billion pounds into the Royal Bank of Scotland and ended up owning about 84% of it. In the same month the United States signed into law a plan worth up to 700 billion dollars.
Why did banks stop lending to each other in 2008?
Because each bank was unsure whether the other would pay it back. Mortgage losses were spread so widely that nobody could tell who held them. The extra price one bank charged another to lend for three months went from about a tenth of a percentage point before August 2007 to about thirty-six times that in October 2008.
What does a triple-A credit rating mean?
A credit rating is a grade for how likely a debt is to be paid back, and triple-A is the top of the scale. It is an estimate of the odds, not a promise. In 2006 one agency gave triple-A to thirty mortgage investments every working day, and 83% of that year's triple-A mortgage investments were later downgraded.
Was Bitcoin created because of the 2008 financial crisis?
Not as a direct response. Whoever started Bitcoin said they had been working on it since 2007, and the paper that first described it never mentions the crisis. But its very first entry, dated 3 January 2009, carries a newspaper headline about a second bank bailout. The crisis did not create Bitcoin; it was the setting it arrived in.
Sources
- Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission — The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011)
- European Central Bank — Monthly Bulletin, September 2007, Box 3
- Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis — The LIBOR-OIS Spread as a Summary Indicator (2008)
- Office of Thrift Supervision — Press release on the closure of Washington Mutual (2008)
- Gallup — Confidence in Institutions (2006–2009)
- Satoshi Nakamoto Institute — Post on the P2P Foundation forum (2009)